Introduction
The effect of foreign exchange market intervention on exchange rates is a subject of continuing controversy. Few doubt that unsterilized intervention may affect nominal exchange rates by changing interest rates and monetary aggregates. However, the effect of sterilized intervention on exchange rates is less clear. The "portfolio balance" channel, through which sterilized intervention changes the currency denomination of relative asset supplies and thereby the exchange risk premium if assets are imperfect substitutes, has received little empirical support (e.g. Rogoff, 1984; Humpage, 1991; Edison, 1993; and Sweeney, 1995, 1996) .
The evidence in favor of a "signaling" channel, through which sterilized intervention may provide new information about policy intentions and hence future fundamentals, is somewhat more supportive. Watanabe (1994) finds that intervention tends to lead discount rate changes and help predict changes in the monetary aggregates in Japan. Using US data, Lewis (1995) finds that intervention (on a daily, weekly or bi-weekly basis) helps predict changes in the interbank interest rate and various monetary aggregates. Lewis finds, however, that intervention only helps predict monetary indicators within a two-week period, and attributes this not to signaling but rather to the particular nature of the Federal Reserve operating procedures (especially the required reserves accounting period) which induces a lag between intervention and sterilization.
Kaminsky an d Lewis (1996) also find that US intervention provides a signal to future changes in interbank rates and monetary aggregates, but sometimes in the opposite direction of that predicted by the conventional signaling hypothesis. Klein and Rosengren (1991) , investigating the signaling hypothesis around two important intervention episodes, find no consistent relationship between US intervention and subsequent monetary policy actions. More generally, Humpage =s (1991) review of the literature on signaling finds mixed results.
In this paper we test for linkages between US daily intervention operations and expected changes in future monetary policy, where a proxy for the latter are obtained from the new Federal funds futures market. Our objective is to use information from the Federal funds future market to test for the effect of intervention on expected monetary policy. We wish to determine whether intervention provides an effective signal which influences expectations over the future course of monetary policy, as opposed to simply introduces "noise" in the system and raising monetary uncertainty. The Federal funds futures contract, introduced by the Chicago Board of Trade in 1988, has not been used in this context previously but should prove a useful proxy for market expectations. The predictive content of Fed funds futures rates is very good, particularly over shorter horizons, and they appear to be rational forecasts of future rates Carlson, McIntire and Thomson, 1995; Krueger and Kuttner, 1995) . These future contract prices, written for any calendar month up to 24 months ahead, also change on a daily basis and may be matched with the daily observations of the Federal Reserve's intervention activities.
We test whether Federal Reserve intervention operations are systematically related to the change in the Federal funds futures rate and its conditional variance--where the former provides evidence of a "signaling" channel and the latter may provide evidence of uncertainty over the course of future monetary policy.
The empirical work is based on estimation of a regression model with a time-varying variance term using a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) model. This model fits well with our financial markets data and allows us to address the questions of interest. In particular, we are able to simultaneously model and estimate the effect of intervention both on the change in the Federal funds future rate and on its conditional variance. We consider several alternative model specifications to check the robustness of the results.
We focus on the March 1989 -December 1993 period. The Fed funds futures market for contracts maturing one-and two-months ahead became active at the beginning of this sample period. In addition, US intervention policy was operating under one regime in terms of its intensity and intent during this sample period.
Focusing attention on this period decreases the likelihood that a change has occurred in the use of intervention as a signal of future monetary policy actions.
The next section discusses our empirical approach and highlights some of the difficulties in testing the signaling hypothesis. Section 3 explains the data in some detail. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Signaling and Monetary Policy
The basic signaling hypothesis may be illustrated by a simple model of the exchange rate and fundamentals. Consider the familiar formulation of the nominal exchange rate ( s t ) as a function of the discounted value (with discount factor θ ) of current and expected future fundamentals ( E f t t j
To be a useful signal of the future fundamental, intervention at time t-k ( n t k − ) must help predict the future value of the fundamental. To illustrate this point, assume Lewis' (1995) formulation where the fundamental follows a simple autoregressive process with the intervention signal entering exogenously together with a random disturbance term (
Intervention itself may also demonstrate various degrees of persistence which may be illustrated by an AR(1) process:
With the specific processes followed by fundamentals and intervention given, expectations of future fundamental values may be determined, and an explicit solution for the exchange rate obtained (4) where
One test of the signaling hypothesis is to estimate (4) directly, attempting to measure the effect of current intervention on the exchange rate over and above the contribution of the current fundamental. This approach is followed by Dominguez (1993) , Dominguez and Frankel (1993a) , and others. If intervention is a good signal ( $ is large in absolute value) and persistent ( Dn is substantially greater than zero), then one would expect a large effect of intervention on the exchange rate. Dominguez (1993) , for example, considers the effect of foreign exchange market intervention on both the conditional mean and conditional variance of daily (and weekly) exchange rate changes. She concludes that intervention (and, more generally, exchange rate policy variables) belong in daily GARCH models of the exchange rate. Changes in contemporaneous monetary policy and intervention policy were found in several cases to influence the conditional variance of exchange rates, and the causal link (using Granger causality tests) appears to run from the policy variables to exchange rate volatility and not vice versa.
Another approach, followed by Lewis (1995) , Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) , Klein and Rosengren (1991) , Watanabe (1994) , and others, is to estimate the fundamentals process (2) and measure the ability of intervention to forecast movements in the fundamental. Lewis (1995) , for example, uses VARs of interventions and monetary policy to investigate whether intervention "Granger causes" monetary policy (i.e. monetary policy is the only fundamental considered). She then uses VARs of monetary policy and exchange rates to determine whether monetary policy "Granger causes" exchange rates. Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) investigate whether interventions that were consistent with expected future monetary policy movements affected the exchange differently than those that were inconsistent. They find some evidence for this proposition.
A third approach, pursued in this paper , is to directly estimate the effect of intervention on changes in expected monetary policy--the "fundamental" being considered--where one has an independent (not modelbased) measure of changes in expectations:
where changes in expected future monetary policy is given by
E f E f t t j t t j
. One innovation of this study is that we use changes in the Federal funds futures rate (FF) as our independent proxy of changes in expected monetary policy, and the conditional variance of FF as a measure of monetary policy uncertainty. The error term, ε t , is modeled as a GARCH process and is considered in some detail in Section 4.0. This "direct" approach is similar to Dominguez and Frankel (1993b) in their investigation of the link between intervention and survey-based measures of exchange rate expectations.
The maintained hypothesis contained in the approach we follow is that intervention is systematically related to expected future policy. We need not assume a particular process driving monetary policy or attempt to capture structural shifts in these processes. 2 Limiting the focus to whether intervention acts as a reliable signal of future policy may be measured directly through surveys of expectations or through futures prices (i.e. no assumptions about the processes driving monetary policy are necessary). 3 An important auxiliary assumption imposed, however, and a limitation of the "direct" approach is that the expected future Fed funds rate (the measure of monetary policy stance) is assumed equal to the Fed funds futures price. That is, it is assumed that there is no risk premium between the Fed funds rate expected to prevail at some future point and the current Fed funds future rate of the same maturity. This is the "cost" of not estimating a monetary policy process. This assumption seems reasonable judging from several studies showing that, although the Fed funds futures rates appear to exhibit a small forward premium, the market seems to efficiently incorporate all publicly available information on the likely direction of future Funds rates movements (Kruger and Kuttner, 1995; Carlson, McIntire and Thomson, 1995) .
Data
We detail below why the daily change in the Federal funds futures rate is a good proxy for changes in expectations over the future stance of monetary policy. We focus on the March 1989 -December 1993 period.
The Federal funds future market for contracts maturing one-and two-months ahead was established at the beginning of this sample period. In addition, the US intervention policy "regime" was roughly unchanged in terms of its intensity and intent (post-Plaza Accord and post-Louvre Agreement) during this sample period.
The Fed Fund Futures Market
The Chicago is also open to others so long as margin requirements are satisfied.
The 30-day interest rate futures contract differs from most other interest rate futures in that the final settlement price is based on an average of past interest rates. Final settlement is based on an arithmetic average of the effective overnight rate, as reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, for the 30-day period immediately preceding the contract maturity date. The average includes weekends and holidays, whose rates are carried over from the rate prevailing on the most recent trading day. As with all other money market futures, prices for the 30-day Fed funds rate futures are quoted as an index equal to 100 minus the futures rate. The price of the current month's contract would reflect a weighted average of the average Fed funds rate for the expired fraction of the current month, plus the term Fed funds rate for the remaining fraction of the month. 5 6 For example, the June settlement price applied to a futures contract purchased on June 21 would be:
100 -price index = (20/30) x (average effective overnight Federal funds rate for the previous 20 days) + (10/30) x (term Fed funds rate for the 10 days beginning June 21).
The price of a deferred month contract-that is, a contract maturing after the current month's settlement date-reflects entirely the 30-day average term Fed funds rate for the month in question. On June 21 (to June 30), for example, the one-month futures contract would consist of the average term Fed funds rate for the month of July. On July 1, the one-month future contract would consist of the average term Fed funds rate for the month of August.
Current and one-month futures contracts (termed "first nearby" and "second nearby", respectively) are the most heavily traded, but trading is also active in two-and three-month futures contracts. However, trading activity diminishes markedly when the maturity extends beyond three months. Contracts beyond five months exist, but appear rather infrequently .
We investigate the effects of intervention on the one-and two-month ("second nearby" and "third nearby") Federal funds futures rates. These are the longest maturities in which contracts are actively traded and with enough depth to the market so that inferences may be confidently drawn about expectations over future developments in the Federal funds market. Our data covers daily observations for the period March 27, 1989, when this segment of the Fed funds futures market opened, to December 31, 1993. The level and first differences of the one-month contracts are shown in Figures 1 and 2 , respectively. The data here is expressed as the implied future term interest rate rather than the index quoted on the CBT exchange. Our sample consists only of outstanding deferred contracts, i.e. always reflecting 30-day averages of the Fed funds term rates for periods either one-or two-months ahead. No maturing contracts (or expiration dates) are included in the sample. Since past spot rates do not enter into the calculation of the price of the contract (unlike the case of the current or "nearby" contracts), maturity effects should not be present. That is, the changes in the Fed interest rate futures contracts with one-month maturities shown in Figure 2 do not exhibit the type of trend associated with currentmonth futures contracts where the average of past spot rates must equal the settlement price on the date of expiration.
Recent studies by Carlson, MacIntire and Thomson (1995) and Krueger and Kuttner ( 1995) show that over the 1989 to 1994 period, Fed funds futures rates provide very accurate forecasts of short-term changes in the Fed funds rate. In fact, both studies find a small ex-post forward premium, but that all systematic variation in the Fed funds rate is antici pated by the market and incorporated into futures prices. 7 The small forward premium bias observed may be specific to the sample chosen, however, as the economy was generally weaker, and the Fed funds rate as a consequence set lower by the FOMC, than had been anticipated by most analysts at the time (Carlson, McIntire and Tompson, 1995; p. 27) . The general conclusion is that the market for Fed fund futures "efficiently incorporates virtually all publicly available information on the likely direction of future funds rate move ments." 8 The Fed funds futures rate appears a good proxy for the rational expectation of the future spot rate in that the futures-based forecast errors are not generally correlated with other information publicly available at the time of the forecast.
Fed funds futures rates also provide good proxies for expected short-term monetary policy developments at different maturities. This is because the Fed funds rate--upon which the futures rates are based--is the primary operating instrument of monetary policy. It is also the most widely cited indicator of policy stance. Rudebusch (1995) , for example, finds that the Fed funds rate adequately reflects monetary policy in the very short term, that is, within a month or two. Similarly, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) This sample period, chosen in light of the avai lability of the Fed funds futures data, omits the strong "leaning against the wind" policy of late 1987 and 1988.
Empirical Methods and Results
If the signaling channel is an important channel through which foreign exchange intervention works, then intervention should change the current perception of the stance of future monetary policy, measured as changes in expectations over the level of future interest rates under the control of the Federal Reserve. In particular, the basic hypothesis is that positive intervention (a purchase of USD against foreign cur rencies)
invokes the expectation of monetary tightening in the future and hence a rise in the Fed funds future rate. The null hypothesis, of course, is that intervention is not interpreted as providing information about the stance of future monetary policy, and hence does not affect interest rate expectations in a systematic and predictable way.
Even if intervention does not provide a clear signal of the stance of future monetary policy, it may still cause varying reactions in the market depending on how a particular action is interpreted. In this case, intervention may simply be creating noise in the market as opposed to providing a clear signal. We also investigate this hypothesis by examining the effect of intervention on conditional volatility of the Federal funds future rate.
Testing the signaling hypothesis
Studies of the variance of financial market time series data often find the variance to be changing over time (heteroscedastic), e.g. Engle (1982) , Bollerslev (1986) and Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992) . Large and small residuals frequently come in clusters, leading to a notion of the variance of an error being dependent on the size of the preceding error. This particular form of heteroscedasticity is denoted autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) and is modeled by letting the variance of the current error be a linear function of the square of the preceding error. A natural generalization of the ARCH model is found in the Generalized ARCH (GARCH) model, in which the conditional variance is a function not only of preceding errors, but also of past conditional variances. Baillie and Bollershev (1989) use the GARCH approach to model the conditional mean and conditional variance of daily exchange rate changes.
Our basic approach follows Engle (1982) where a regression equation is estimated with the residuals modeled as a GARCH process. In addition, we follow Baillie and Bollershev (1989) and others by simultaneously modeling the focus independent variable (in our case, intervention), both in the mean and variance equations of the process governing the dependent variable (change in Fed funds future rate). The basic regression model with GARCH(1,1) errors that we estimate is equation (5) and: 
where equation (6) states that the error term is normally distributed with zero mean and time dependent (conditional) variance, h t , and equation (7) shows the conditional variance, where e t 2 is the squared error of the previous period, h t −1 the conditional variance of the previous period, n t the absolute value of intervention (millions of US dollars), and the α 's are parameters.
We also test for day-of-the-week effects, in line with the studies of French (1980) , Gibbons and Hess (1981) , and others (focused mainly on expected daily stock returns) to investigate whether there are significant differences in the change in fed funds future rate depending on the day of the week trading is conducted. A significant effect is found on the Friday dummy variable (FRIDAY), and this is included in the regressions, but not for any other day of the week. In additon, we test for the possibility that the conditional variance enters into the mean equation (equation 5), i.e. a garch-in-mean specification (GARCH-M). We find that strong evidence for the GARCH-M specification, and this is also included as part of basic specification of the model.
The unconditional variance is time invariant, and so the OLS estimation technique produces BLUE estimates of equation (5), but because of the heteroscedastic conditional variance it is possible to find a more efficient nonlinear estimator by the use of the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation technique. We follow this approach in estimating our model.
Model Statistics
The results are presented in Table 2 for the one-month ahead futures rate and Table 3 A number of estimated model diagnostic statistics are presented at the foot of each column. Log L denotes the value of the log-likelihood function; LR denotes the log-likelihood ratio test comparing the loglikelihood function from the final interaction with that calculated initially for just the constant term; Q (15) and Q 2 (15) denote the Box-Pierce Q -statistic with 15 lags on the standardized residuals and squared standardized residuals, respectively; m 3 and m 4 denote the standard measures of skewness and kurtosis, respectively; ARCH is the F-statistic value of the null hypothesis of no ARCH in the standardized residuals; OBS is the number of observations in the sample estimated, and "iterations" is the number of interations taken to converge to the final
ML estimates
The results reported in both Tables 2 and 3 However, the absolute value of intervention by the Federal Reserve, n t , does appear to raise the conditional variance of the Federal funds futures rate. In all four models estimated in Tables 2 and 3, intervention operations-either in buying or selling dollars for foreign exchange-is positively associated with increased volatility in the Fed funds futures market. These estimates are significant at the 95 percent level of confidence or better. This is consistent with the Diebold and Nerlove (1989) hypothesis that ambiguous signals-in this case the intent of the monetary authorities with respect to monetary policy and intervention operations-may increase market volatility.
Discussion
Our results may be compared to other studies in this area using different methodologies, sample periods and data sets. Most relevant is the work of Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) , who reject the hypothesis that interventions convey no signal over future monetary policy developments. However, they find that intervention "signaled" changes in monetary policy in the opposite direction of the conventional signaling story for much of the sample period Second, signaling may be an effective channel only when combined with other policy actions such as an official announcement by the Federal Reserve over its policy intentions. This is examined in Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) with some success using several monetary policy variables. This is on our agenda for future research using the Fed funds future rate data. monetary policy actions--judging by the failure of interest rate expectations to respond--but apparently increases "noise" and market volatility. At a minimum, our results suggest that it is difficult to identify a clear and effective "signaling" channel, and that the sporadic intervention policy followed by the Fed (and ultimately the US Treasury) could lead to greater monetary uncertainty. Table 1 Total US Intervention, March 27, 1989 to Dec. 31, 1993 ( 
